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Green Power and Performance in 
Global Environmental Governance
Babett e Never
From 10 to 11 June 2013, the Global Green Growth Summit will take place in Seoul. Pol-
icymakers, international organizations and experts from various fi elds will once again 
discuss how the transformation toward a green economy and more sustainable devel-
opment paths can be managed.
Analysis
Global environmental governance is characterized by a high number of international 
activities, but actual environmental outcomes vary. The ability to develop green politi-
cal and economic power that leads to bett er environmental performance is not restrict-
ed to industrialized countries anymore. China, South Korea, Brazil and India are slow-
ly catching up, while some small developing nations have also begun to generate pow-
er for a green change.
  The heterogeneous behavior of the emerging economies undermines their green 
power in central environmental regimes. This heterogeneity is refl ected in their dif-
fering development of green power outside of the internationally negotiated trea-
ties. 
  “Green power” refers to the ability to successfully combine technological capabili-
ties, environmental innovations, political and economic power. None of the central 
actors currently possess it in a way that positions them as leaders in smart global 
environmental governance.
  In the climate negotiations, China and the United States are in a balance of power 
that is negative for the environment. China has surpassed the United States in the 
use of clean technology. However, it still lags behind in achieving bett er environ-
mental outcomes.
  Costa Rica, Norway and Ecuador have accumulated some green power in spite of 
their respective economic sizes, bolstering it with good environmental performance. 
Nonetheless, in the global distribution of power, this is hardly relevant.
  Neither Europe nor Germany currently uses its full green power potential. Both are 
restricted by hesitant behavior, a drop in new investments in clean technology and 
innovation as well as China’s structural power gain. 
Keywords: environmental performance, climate change, emerging economies, environmental 
innovation, global power shift
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Change through Green Power?
Global environmental governance is constituted 
of a variety of environmental regimes, state and 
nonstate actors working internationally and do-
mestically toward a green economy and sustain-
able, low-carbon development. Some of their ac-
tions are more eﬀ ective than others. Some coun-
tries perform very well in terms of actual environ-
mental outcomes, while others lag behind. This 
split no longer mirrors the North-South divide. 
Particularly in the clean technology markets, 
shifts toward the Global South have become in-
creasingly visible. This challenges the dominance 
of previous environmental leaders among the in-
dustrialized countries – such as Germany, Den-
mark and the United States. Chinese and Indian 
solar and wind energy companies, for instance, 
have caught up with the technological frontier 
and have begun to substantially increase their 
market shares (Ren21, 2012). No matt er what kind 
of green transformation societies aim for, it is clear 
that environmental innovation and clean technol-
ogy have to provide a signifi cant part. Current and 
prospective increases in environmental resource 
use and demand, rising greenhouse gas emissions 
and the impacts of climate change cannot be man-
aged sustainably with existing technologies and 
processes. But what type of power is necessary 
for successfully managing the required changes? 
Who has the kind of power necessary and when 
is it actually eﬀ ective? The concept of green pow-
er helps answer these questions as it is intrinsical-
ly linked to environmental performance and tran-
scends disciplines. In this article, green power al-
ways refers to the types of economic and political 
power that draw on diﬀ erent resources and pro-
cesses; it does not relate to the transmission of en-
ergy and electricity. 
The following features of green power provide 
the starting points for the analysis:
1) Green power is multidimensional. Instrumen-
tal power enables an actor to directly infl uence 
or coerce others. Structural power allows an ac-
tor to shape the context and rules aﬀ ecting oth-
ers according to his own interests. Discursive 
power permits an actor to indirectly shape the 
identity, perceptions and preferences of other 
actors. These three faces of power (Lukes 1974) 
entail hard and soft resources. 
2) Green power is relational; it always exists in 
relation to others and thus needs to be under-
stood as a process in a certain context.
3) Green power captures the share of global com-
mons a country possesses as well as a country’s 
ability to make use of this share in internation-
al negotiations and/or to att ract external fund-
ing for its protection.
4) Green power incorporates a country’s techno-
logical capabilities and its absorptive capacity 
for environmental innovations.
If actors possess green power in one or more of 
these dimensions, it does not necessarily mean 
they actively use it. Passive behavior can have 
widespread consequences, especially regarding 
global public goods such as the global climate. 
The climate regime therefore provides a promi-
nent illustration of this behavior.
Power Distribution in the Climate Regime
In the climate regime, it is no longer the case that 
only the industrialized countries are in strong 
structural power positions. Developing countries 
with signifi cant greenhouse gas emissions now 
have structural veto power due to the fact that 
any new climate treaty would be ineﬀ ective with-
out their participation. This group includes the so-
called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, In-
dia, China) and other emerging economies such as 
Mexico, South Korea and Indonesia. Smaller de-
veloping countries mainly have discursive pow-
er. At the climate conference in Doha in December 
2012, bureaucratic processing was at the forefront 
instead of political maneuvering, leaving the un-
derlying power distributions largely intact. 
The structural power of Brazil and Indonesia 
in the climate regime diﬀ ers somewhat from the 
other emerging economies because of the large 
amounts of rainforests they harbor. In the past, 
the rainforest nations exerted instrumental pow-
er by successfully sett ing a fi nancial compensation 
mechanism for forest conservation on the negotia-
tion agenda (Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation [REDD]). Papua New 
Guinea and Costa Rica have been particularly ac-
tive in this regard (Lederer 2012). In Doha, Pap-
ua New Guinea pushed for the establishment of 
a REDD committ ee, but the issue was postponed 
until the 2013 negotiation rounds.
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The heavyweights of Brazil and Indonesia still 
support REDD, but both are now active in oth-
er channels in case the climate regime fails. Both 
countries have set up national trust funds that fi -
nance local forest conservation and aﬀ orestation 
projects to which donor countries have already 
made substantial pledges. Ecuador and Guyana 
have followed suit. This limits the structural pow-
er of the rainforest coalition in the international 
negotiations and presents a particular disadvan-
tage to those countries that do not have the means 
to simultaneously pursue their interests within 
and outside of the regime. Therefore, it is not pos-
sible to speak of a general rise of the South in the 
climate negotiations (Lederer 2012).
Moreover, BASIC is not as homogenous a 
group as it seems (Hallding et al 2011). BASIC ex-
erted some direct instrumental power at the Co-
penhagen negotiations in 2009 when it managed 
to overrule the EU and shape the Copenhagen Ac-
cord largely in line with its own interests. How-
ever, diﬀ erences in power and the relational qual-
ity of power have become more apparent since 
then – both between the BASIC countries and be-
tween them and their respective regions. In ad-
dition, BASIC’s power is limited by the structur-
al and instrumental power of the industrialized 
countries and the moral-discursive power of the 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Alli-
ance of Small Island States (AOSIS), who will be 
hit hardest by the impacts of climate change even 
though they have not caused it. Furthermore, un-
like BASIC, they are not responsible for acceler-
ating climate change with their current levels of 
emissions. While this has led to a sense of respon-
sibility and fi nancial support by some industri-
alized countries, the framing of international eq-
uity has not yet turned into substantial fi nancial 
commitment by all industrialized countries. The 
LDCs, the AOSIS and other emerging economies 
– such as India – emphasize that the industrial-
ized countries are largely responsible for climate 
change and should therefore not only mitigate 
their own emissions, they should also help the 
poorer countries adapt to the impacts of climate 
change. In Doha, only the EU, Germany, France, 
the UK, Denmark and Sweden announced con-
crete fi nancial pledges until 2015.
Brazil and South Africa are generally more 
open to binding mitigation targets than India and 
China. Due to internal discrepancies over the ex-
tent and calculation of voluntary commitments 
(BASIC Experts 2011), among other things, BA-
SIC is missing out on the possibility to strength-
en its power position as a group. In relation to In-
dia, China has more active discursive power, even 
though it did not use it in Doha. Right at the be-
ginning of the Durban negotiations in 2011, the 
Chinese government signaled that it would take 
part in a post-2020 climate treaty - even though 
it did not use it in Doha. India is mor reluctant. 
After the promotion of the rather progressive 
minister of environment and forests, Jairam Ra-
mesh, to another portfolio in July 2011, India be-
gan to fall back into blocking mode. This promo-
tion therefore needs to be seen as a de facto dis-
missal. In contrast to the other three BASIC coun-
tries, India’s power derives less from active shap-
ing and infl uencing than from blocking. The only 
exception is its active engagement for the setup of 
a center for clean technology. Technology transfer 
is clearly in India’s interest. Furthermore, similar 
to China and South Africa, the veto power of the 
domestic coal and oil industry should not be un-
derestimated. The chances are rather low that In-
dia will be successful in its calls for greater equi-
ty by strengthening its instrumental and structur-
al power position with new partners. Even togeth-
er with the LDCs, the establishment of a discourse 
on climate justice has not been successful in shap-
ing the climate regime in a decisive way (Roberts 
2011).
China and the United States are in a negative 
balance of power. Neither of them will take a deci-
sive step forward in the climate negotiations with-
out the other doing the same. Both countries are 
in an extremely strong power position that could 
be used to shape the prospective climate regime. 
However, they do not use this potential due to do-
mestic political and economic reasons. The likeli-
hood of passing any kind of federal climate poli-
cy through the US Congress is currently very low, 
even though various actions are being taken at 
state and local levels. In the short term, the bal-
ance of power between the United States and Chi-
na in the international negotiations impedes polit-
ical leaps forward.
In the past two to three years, only the EU has 
possessed and used some clear instrumental pow-
er. At present, it does not use it as actively as be-
fore. The increasing internal disaccord between 
member countries is weakening previous power 
gains, particularly due to the defensive stance of 
Poland. In Doha, the EU achieved its goal to make 
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the second commitment period to the Kyoto Proto-
col ready for ratifi cation but did not opt to unilat-
erally raise its emission reduction targets. More-
over, the EU slightly increased its moral-discur-
sive att raction among developing countries, be-
ing one of the few negotiating parties that contin-
ued so-called fast-start fi nance beyond 2013. Nei-
ther the EU as a whole nor Germany separately 
possesses more or less structural power than the 
other major players in the current climate nego-
tiations. However, neither uses its full power po-
tential, which is evidenced by their continued fail-
ure to apply pressure to their traditional transat-
lantic allies – the United States and Canada. The 
EU’s quest for leadership in the climate regime is 
thus overshadowed by greater diplomatic/strate-
gic alliances.
The exit of Canada, Russia, New Zealand and 
Japan from the Kyoto Protocol has two sides to 
it. On the one hand, the Kyoto Protocol has been 
saved from complete failure. This can be interpret-
ed as the successful application of direct instru-
mental power by the supporters of the protocol. 
On the other hand, their exit is detrimental to the 
managing of climate change due to the high emis-
sions and the resulting structural power that Can-
ada, Russia and Japan hold. In Doha, there were 
fi erce power and interest struggles concerning the 
transfer and sale of any surplus emission rights 
from the fi rst Kyoto period to the second. The re-
sulting compromise only allows those countries 
participating in the second period to transfer and 
sell their surplus rights. This is a slight instrumen-
tal power gain for benefi ciaries such as Poland, 
but a power loss for Russia. At the time of writ-
ing, it remains unclear whether Belarus, Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan will also leave the Kyoto Proto-
col. In any case, the climate regime has been fur-
ther weakened by the numerous withdrawals.
South Africa is torn between the interests of 
BASIC, legitimating itself as a representative of 
sub-Saharan Africa and the demand to be a reli-
able partner for the North (Att eridge 2010). South 
Africa’s power is generally smaller than that of 
the other BASIC countries, but greater in relation 
to its region. This greater power related to its re-
gion primarily derives from the discursive dimen-
sion, as the country managed to foster transparen-
cy and the participation of the LDCs and civil soci-
ety organizations in Durban 2011. But the capacity 
to produce a feel-good eﬀ ect by holding tradition-
al African participatory meetings (Indabas) will 
not limit global warming. It is becoming harder 
for South Africa to maintain its bridging function 
between industrialized and developing countries.
The breakup of the G77 into the LDCs on the 
one hand and BASIC and other emerging coun-
tries of the South on the other has become increas-
ingly obvious. In 2012, the developing countries 
divided into diﬀ erent groups. The LDCs and AO-
SIS remain as negotiating alliances, while Colom-
bia, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Pan-
ama formed the new Association of Independent 
Latin American and Caribbean states (AILAC). 
The AILAC calls for the mitigation of emissions by 
industrialized and developing countries as well as 
an incentive system to do so for all countries. Op-
posing the AILAC is the new Like Minded Group 
of countries, which is comprised of members of 
the Arab Group, Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, India and China. This latt er group con-
tinues to advocate for international equity and 
the historical responsibility of the industrialized 
countries (ENB 2012). These alliances have start-
ed to shift the relational power between negotiat-
ing parties. As it stands, however, no gain in pow-
er that would change the general standoﬀ  in the 
negotiations is expected for any negotiating party.
Green Power through Clean Technology 
The distribution of green power in the climate re-
gime converges only partially with current de-
velopments in the global clean technology mar-
kets. In 2012, China led global new investments 
in clean technology with $67.7 billion, followed by 
the US with $44.4 billion. Germany thus dropped 
from second place, which it achieved in 2011. 
New investments in India declined by 44 percent 
compared to the previous year as a result of few-
er solar project approvals and the end of the do-
mestic incentive scheme for wind power. Austra-
lia, South Africa, Morocco, Ukraine, Mexico, Ke-
nya, Brazil, Ethiopia, Chile and South Korea were 
among the countries to see at least one project of 
more than $250 million fi nanced during 2012 (Iso-
la/Zindler 2013). In 2011, the United States and 
Europe led government and corporate research 
and development (R&D) expenditure in renew-
able energy. While Brazil and India stood out 
among the emerging economies, China was and 
still is the only country that is on its way to reach-
- 5 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  6/2013
ing the same levels of R&D expenditure as the in-
dustrialized countries.
Several Chinese and Indian solar energy and 
wind energy companies rank among the top 10 
globally (Ren21, 2012). Together, Chinese compa-
nies have a 30 percent share of the global market 
for wind turbine production. Moreover, China has 
the highest installed wind capacity in the world 
with 63 MW, followed by the United States, Ger-
many, Spain and India.1 Among the top 15 glob-
al producers of photovoltaic (PV) cells, 7 are Chi-
nese corporations. European and US PV produc-
ers have become increasingly concerned by the 
Chinese competition, which already produces 55 
percent of PV cells globally. This saw the United 
States begin to impose low-level import tariﬀ s on 
Chinese solar cells in 2012. Following a lawsuit by 
European solar fi rms (among them the German 
producer SolarWorld), the European Commission 
initiated an antidumping procedure against Chi-
nese producers in September 2012. In May 2013, 
the Commission agreed to impose an average im-
port tariﬀ  of 47 percent on Chinese solar panels 
starting in June 2013. At the time of writing, this 
decision was up for debate among the EU mem-
ber states. 
China’s structural power – and to a lesser ex-
tent that of India – has greatly increased in the 
wind and solar markets. It is opposed by Europe’s 
structural power, especially that of Germany. In 
the short term, the shift of the global renewable 
energy market has resulted in a loss of structur-
al power in environmental governance for Germa-
ny and Europe. In the long run, however, the re-
duction in the number of German companies to 
those with a substantial technological advantage 
could be benefi cial. With Chinese PV cells now 
comparable to German products in terms of quali-
ty, German renewable energy and energy eﬃ  cien-
cy companies must improve technologically to se-
cure Germany’s structural power in global envi-
ronmental governance. This can only be achieved 
through more investment in R&D and a systemat-
ic use of green innovation potential, which is like-
ly to be more eﬀ ective if targeted at fewer tech-
nogically advanced companies. Overall, Germa-
ny, the United States and Europe still invest far 
more in R&D than the emerging economies of the 
1  World Wind Energy Association, World Market Recovers and 
Sets New Record, 7 February 2012, Online: <www.wwindea.
org/> (accessed 12 February 2012).
South (Kappel/Pohl 2013). However, the solar in-
dustry has been neglected in this regard.
Patents in environmental technology indi-
cate the technological capabilities of a country – 
a cornerstone of its green power. Between 2005 
and 2011, Japan and Europe led in innovations in 
green technology (Figure 1). They were followed 
by the United States and South Korea, which have 
been caught up over time by China. Among the 
top 20 countries, China is (apart from Russia) the 
only emerging economy; this underlines the gen-
eral increase of its power in global environmen-
tal governance in this green power dimension as 
well. However, the continued dominance of Euro-
pean and developed Asian countries along with 
the United States supports the active green power 
of these countries’ governments and their compa-
nies in the global market.
Figure 1: Leaders in Environmental Technology 
Patent Grants 2005–2011
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization Statis-
tics Database.
For those developing countries that are already 
participating in clean technology markets, the 
structural power and the economic dominance 
of Asian, European and US companies are too 
strong. Even though investments are partly in-
creasing and more renewable energy and energy 
eﬃ  ciency projects exist, they have not been able to 
infl uence this area of global environmental gover-
nance yet. Only some of the emerging economies 
and the industrialized countries are therefore 
able to strengthen their overall active green pow-
er through innovation and market share in clean 
technology. These results confi rm that a diﬀ erenti-
ated view on the global economic performance po-
tential of emerging economies is required, as pro-
vided by the Global Performance Indicator (GPI) 
(see Kappel/Pohl 2013). The GPI clarifi es that on-
ly some of the emerging economies have the po-
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tential to catch up with the industrialized coun-
tries and to play a truly infl uential role in glob-
al governance. However, not all emerging econo-
mies that stand out in the GPI – such as South Af-
rica and Vietnam – are developing into well-per-
forming green powers.
Does Green Power Lead to Bett er 
Environmental Performance?
The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) mea-
sures how close countries are to att aining their es-
tablished environmental policy goals in 10 poli-
cy categories concerning environmental stresses 
to human health and ecosystem vitality. The EPI 
uses 22 indicators that are weighted, aggregated 
and then compared to the respective policy goal 
taken from national regulations and internation-
al treaties (Emerson et al. 2012). Table 1 lists the 
EPI ranks of the central actors discussed here and 
provides additional data for the development of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Fossil fuels and emis-
sions stemming from deforestation make up the 
majority of countries’ greenhouse gas emissions. 
The deforestation rate is an indicator of the emis-
sions from deforestation.
Table 1: Environmental Performance of Key 
Actors
EPI 2012
rank
CO2 emissionsa
(total in million 
tons)
United States 49 5 368.6
China 116 7 258.5
EU -  3 659.5
Germany 11 761.6
Norway 3 39.2
India 125 1 625.8
Brazil 30 387.7
South Africa 128 346.8
Indonesia 74 410.9
Japan 23 1 143.1
South Korea 43 563.1
Costa Rica 5 6.5
Ecuador 31 30.1
Colombia 27 1 310
Papua New Guinea 
(for the AOSIS)c 124
3.4
CO2 emissions a
(kg/capita)
Deforestationb
(% annual change
 2005-2010)
United States 17 312 + 0.13
China 5 395 + 1.39
EU 7 294 Not available
Germany 9 315    0
Norway 8 011 +0.78
India 1 388 +0.21
Brazil 1 989 -0.42
South Africa 6 938    0
Indonesia 1 713 -0.71
Japan 8 974 +0.04
South Korea 11 521 -0.11
Costa Rica 1 403 +0.90
Ecuador 2 081 -1.89
Colombia 60499 -0.17
Papua New Guinea 
(for the AOSIS)c
500 -0.49
a CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. Source: Interna-
tional Energy Agency 2012.
b “-” signifi es deforestation, “+” indicates aﬀ orestation. 
Source: FAO 2012.
c 2009 is the latest year available. Source: World Bank.
In 2012, the top fi ve performers were Switz erland, 
Latvia, Norway, Luxembourg and Costa Rica. This 
reveals that the central actors with large amounts 
of green power in the climate regime and/or clean 
technology markets do not all automatically per-
form well. China has a very low EPI rank in spite 
of its rising position in the clean technology fi eld. 
Its high carbon emissions have put the country in 
a power position in the climate negotiations. But 
they have also created the necessity for China to 
improve its environmental performance, rather 
than simply investing in clean technology. While 
the Chinese government has managed to success-
fully implement aﬀ orestation programs, the sheer 
extent of increasing local environmental challeng-
es has limited the possibility to turn passive green 
power into active green power; India is in a simi-
lar position. Brazil’s fairly good EPI rank is over-
shadowed by its high deforestation rate. If it man-
aged to halt this deforestation, the country would 
benefi t from a far stronger green power position, 
making up for the comparably low amount of in-
novation in clean technology. 
Some smaller countries – such as Costa Ri-
ca, Norway, Colombia and Ecuador – have per-
formed very well. Ecuador has even managed to 
turn its high deforestation rate into an advantage, 
thus accruing green power. Therefore, it cannot be 
assumed that only industrialized countries man-
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age to develop green power on the way toward 
green transformation. However, these small-
er countries’ play a largely insignifi cant role in 
terms of clean technology innovation and the cor-
responding market development. Here, Germany, 
Japan and South Korea back up their green pow-
er with good environmental performance. How-
ever, none of them use their green power poten-
tial in the climate regime to the full extent; Japan 
in particular keeps a low profi le in the climate ne-
gotiations.
The Future of Green Power
None of the central actors discussed here possess 
active green power in all dimensions. In general, 
the industrialized countries still have and could 
exert more green power – although China, Bra-
zil, India and even Costa Rica are catching up in 
some areas. China’s power is generally increasing 
in the structural dimension, but the country does 
not use its instrumental and discursive power in 
the negotiations to establish a global leadership 
position. Instead, China is situated in a balance of 
power with the United States. India is the poster 
child of veto power. It is less successful in the dis-
cursive dimension, but seeks to increase its power 
in the structural dimension outside of the climate 
regime. In principle, Europe and Germany have 
the potential to become leading green powers, but 
they are too hesitant and fi nd themselves restrict-
ed by China’s structural power gain. Most of Ger-
many’s structural power stems from the renew-
able energy sector but is being increasingly chal-
lenged by China and India.
The diﬀ erentiation between active and passive 
green power is particularly relevant in the current 
polycentric environmental governance system. 
A country may behave passively in international 
negotiations, but actively build and exert its green 
power at other levels and through other channels. 
Moreover, changes in global environmental 
governance have made it clear that green power is 
not necessarily related to the economic relevance 
of a country. There are diﬀ erent paths available 
for a green transformation, which correspond to 
the diﬀ ering cores of a country’s green power 
and domestic context factors. Technological 
capabilities and structural power are likely to 
increase a country’s green power, while moral-
discursive power alone will not suﬃ  ce for the 
development of substantial green power. For 
the moment, it remains an open question which 
combination of green power elements leads to the 
smart governance of the environment measured 
by bett er environmental performance.
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